






3. 2 ERISAによるリスク保障 (以上、48 巻 3・4 号)
3. 3 ERISAのリスク (以下、本号)
3. 4 司法のリスク
4 まとめ

























































































































なところもある。ERISA は伝統的でシンプルな DB プランを保護・育成
しようとするものの、近年設立される年金プランは、そういったシンプル
さからは遠い。集団の不確実性の最小化に優先する法準則を選ぶ観点は変















































































































































































































































































































































































( 1 ) For example, promises―or identifiable aspects of promises―that pose
massive performance uncertainty but little collective uncertainty likely
deserve different legal rules than promises with a converse balance of
uncertainty. The simple reason is that rules that potently address
uncertainty of a certain type and magnitude may do little to address (and
oftenworsen) uncertainty of a different type and size. The uncertainty to be
tamed drives rule selection.
( 2 ) Ippolito, ERISA Study, supra note 64, at 87 (―Defined benefit pension
plans are the primary focus of ERISA. . .).
( 3 ) 91. 29 U. S. C. §§ 1081-1086 (2006).
( 4 ) 29 U. S. C. § 1103(a) (2006) (―[A]ll assets of an employee benefit plan
shall be held in trust by one or more trustees ‖ who, subject to limited
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exceptions, ―shall have exclusive authority and discretion to manage and
control the assets of the plan . . . .‖).
( 5 ) 29 U. S. C. § 1104(a) (2006) ; see also infra note 126 and accompanying
text.
( 6 ) 29 U. S. C. § 1302 (2006). According to ERISA, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was created :
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private
pension plans for the benefit of their participants, (2) to provide for the
timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and
beneficiaries under plans to which this subchapter applies, and (3) to
maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 1306 of this
title at the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this
subchapter.
( 7 ) The argument would be that strict funding requirements―and the cost of
regulatorycompliance―discourage the offering of pensions, including some
pensions that would have in fact been performed (i. e., the reduced
performance uncertainty of strict funding requirements is outweighed by
increased collective uncertainty).
( 8 ) Certainly defined benefits also transfer retirement income risk from the
promisee to thepromisor, although that self-evidently depends on the financial
robustness of the promisor and the scope of any government guarantee. In
contrast, far too infrequently acknowledged is the real work that defining the
benefit accomplishes. Clarity supplies utility whether the promise is soundly
or weakly backed.
( 9 ) 29 U. S. C. § 1102(b)(4) ; see also MCGILL, supra note 56, at 46 (―This
requirementʼs fundamental purpose is to ensure that the plan is a formal
arrangement, communicated as such to all employees affected, and that it is
distinguishable from the informal and unenforceable arrangements that
characterized the early years of the private pension movement in this
country. ‖).
(10) 29 U. S. C. § 1102(a)(1) (2006).
(11) See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 1022 (a) (2006) (requiring a summary plan
description―written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant‖) ; S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 11 (1973) http : //openscholar-
ship. see also 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (2006)(providing remedies for
violations of disclosure and reporting requirements).
(12) 29 U. S. C. § 1053(a) (2006). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
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99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, amended ERISA and shortened the vesting periods.
See also Langbein, supra note 43, at 227(footnote omitted)
(13) Defined benefit pension plans are required to provide benefits that are
computed via a fixed formula and not within the discretion of the promisor.
See Rev. Rul. 74-385, 1974-2 C. B. 130 ; 26 C. F. R. § 1. 401-1(b)(1)(i) (2009)
(requiring that a plan provide―definitely determinable benefits‖) ; see also
26 U. S. C. § 401(a)(25) (2006).
(14) One such example was the inclusion of broad preemption provisions. See
29 U. S. C. § 1144 (a) (2006). Preemption, among other things, shields
promisors that conduct multistate businessfrom having to comply with the
regulatory requirements of several jurisdictions, which can pose significant
cost.
(15) Congress specifically authorized a private right of action permitting a
participant orbeneficiary in any ERISA plan to bring suit to, inter alia,
―enforce his rights under the terms of the plan. ‖ 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(1)
(B) (2006) ; see also infra note 151 and accompanying text.
(16) For reasons we explore below, however, ERISA has been interpreted by
the Supreme Courtsuch that ―consequential damages are not allowed. ‖
Epstein & Sykes, supra note.
(17) Employees face well-recognized cognitive and transaction cost limitations.
See, e. g., supra note. Thus, the more complex the defined benefit promise,
the more likely the employee will be unaware of its terms.
(18) Failure to honor a complex promise may never be detected (i. e., some
beneficiaries may not ultimately realize that the promisor is interpreting the
promise in a less generousmanner thanoriginally intended). Failure to honor
a complex promise is also less likely to result in reputational costs (i. e.,
violating the clear terms of a simple pension is considerably more likely to
damage a promisorʼs reputation). And failure to honor a complex promise is
less likely to result in ex post legal sanction because it may be difficult, in
practice, to establish that the promise was broken.
(19) In our view, the same cannot be said for non-formula-based defined benefits
such as health insurance. See infra Part III. C (exploring, at length, the
nature and consequences of the health insurance benefit).
(20) Perhaps the downside is that simpler promises do not accurately reflect the
nuancedpreferences of the players. But that is a policy judgment. Imagine
the following : Under RegimeA, pension promises are subject to traditional or
employee-favoring legal rules. In such a regime, onewould expect simple and
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generic defined benefit pensions that closely resemble (or in fact are)
standard annuities bought and sold on the open market, with little
expectation uncertainty and few disputes. Under Regime B, pension
promises are subject to promisor-favoring legal rules (e. g., damage
limitations, standards of review deferential to the promisor, and mandatory
administrative review prior to commencement of suit). One would expect
complicated pensions that might better reflect the specific preferences of
many employees but which would also pose heightened expectation risk.
Which regime is ―better‖ depends on empirics and normative judgments.
(21) 29 U. S. C. § 1022(a) (2006) ; see also supra note 101 (discussing § 1022
(a)).
(22) For an excellent treatment of the economic arguments underlying the
debate over this issue, see James A. Wooten, Who Should Own a Pension
Surplus―Employer or Employees? An Assessment of Arguments about
Asymmetry of Risks and Rewards and Deferred Wages in Pension Plans
(May 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http : //ssrn.
com/abstract=1141918. For a comprehensive economic analysis of an
analogous issue in the non-retirement-plan setting, see MARK J.
WARSHAWSKY, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF RETIREE
(23) Some arrangements couple an employeeʼs pretax wage contribution with a
employer match, but, functionally, the total ―contribution‖ is all employee
compensation. In economic terms, the match represents foregone wages.
See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining that all benefits are wage
substitutes).
(24) This is true even where there is no matching contribution ; in that case, the
employer ispromising to administer the transfer of the employee contribu-
tion.
(25) Were neither of these the case, the arrangement would not be a bilateral
benefit promise. It would be an individual tax-preferred savings plan self-
administered by the employee who self-fundedwith wages.
(26) We use principal and agent in the economic sense―where PartyA engages
Party B to act on Party Aʼs behalf―not the formal legal sense, where control
is an element of agency.
(27) To what extent such duties are subject to change by agreement is a matter
of much academic debate. See, e. g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B. C. L. REV. 595, 598 (1997).
(28) See supra text accompanying note 115 (identifying the relevance of
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fiduciary duties in some defined benefit pension plan disputes).
(29) See, e. g., Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 303 (1999) (―Fiduciary law delineates the ways in
which such relationships arise and identifiesthe standards of conduct to which
a fiduciary must conform, including requirements of loyalty, zeal, and self-
sacrifice. ‖).
(30) Some prominent theorists have described the fiduciary relationship as an
example of a ―relational ‖ or ―incomplete ‖ contract. See Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1127 (1981)
(31) Whether converting the fiduciary standard to a specialized rule is desirable
in any particular circumstance is, of course, a separate question. The
predictability of any rulemay be outweighed bythe loss of flexibility inherent
in the fiduciary standard. Moreover, one might challenge the likelihood that
government officials will select a desirable rule.
(32) See, e. g.,Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 505 F. 3d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 2007).
(33) This is true because fiduciaries may have insufficient incentive to exercise
care in dispensing advice. Accordingly, fiduciary conduct (or inaction) may
result in promisees actively forming mistaken expectations about the content
or consequences of the benefit promise.
(34) Hyman & Hall, supra note.
(35) Assume a potential insured determines that the likelihood of getting sick in
the coming year is 20%, and the average cost of treatment is $200. An
actuarially fair premium is. 2 x 200, or $40. Of course, the various illnesses
one could get vary widely. As such, the cost of treatment varies enormously.
Without knowing the extent of such variance, onewould have little basis upon
which to reasonably calculate the additional risk premium one was willing to
pay. Cognitive biases, of course, complicate the matter further.
(36) Moreover, such a deal is consistent with social norms always and
everywhere promoting the supremacy of health among lifeʼs circumstances.
(37) Moreover, such a deal is consistent with social norms always and
everywhere promoting the supremacy of health among lifeʼs circumstances.
(38) See, e. g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2008)
(citation omitted).
(39) See JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION
544 (2d ed. 2005).
(40) This volatility is arguably increased because impartial arbiters may be
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emotionally biased in favor of individuals seeking care.
(41) A unit of medical care (e. g., a drug, surgery, or diagnostic procedure)
that does fivepeppercorns of good is arguably more―necessary ‖ than one
that does four peppercorns of good, irrespective of the potentially steep cost
of the fifth peppercorn.
(42) JOSEPH P.NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS :AHEALTH CARE
CONUNDRUM 79-103 (2002).
(43) There are volatility concerns even in the context of ―physical ‖
consequential injuries (i. e., a worsened physical condition). The likelihood of
such consequences varieswidely and isextraordinarily difficult to predict. Cf.
McCahill v. N. Y. Transp. Co., 94 N. E. 616 (N. Y. 1911) (man dies from
delirium tremens while hospitalized from car accident). Moreover, it is often
difficult to assess whether the consequential injury was partially, or entirely,
the result of something other than the benefit denial or delay. See, e. g.,
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J.
1353 (1981).
(44) See, e. g., DavidM. Studdert et al., ExpandedManaged Care Liability :What
Impact onEmployer Coverage?, 18 HEALTH AFF. 7, 8 (1999).
(45) For example, it is likely that the limitation of remedies available to victims
of wrongful benefit denial or delay will significantly increase performance
uncertainty.
(46) See, e. g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note, at 1107 (arguing that―themess
in ERISA fiduciary law cannot be ameliorated until courts. . . recognize the
multiplicity of interests that inhere in the modern pension and employee
benefit trust).
(47) At one oral argument, Chief Justice John Roberts candidly remarked :
―youʼre right that we judicially have developed a number of glosses on
[ERISA], including I think most importantly theFirestone deference
principle.
(48) See 29 U. S. C. § 1132 (a) (2) (authorizing a civil action to recover
―appropriate relief‖) ; 29 U. S. C. § 1109(a) (2006).
(49) 29 U. S. C. § 1132 (a) (3) (B) (authorizing a civil action to recover
―appropriate equitable relief ‖ to redress violations of the statute or the
terms of the ERISA plan at issue) ; see, e. g., Sereboff v.Mid Atl.Med. Servs.,
Inc., 547 U. S. 356 (2006) ; Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U. S. 204 (2002) ; Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U. S. 248 (1993) ; cf.
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Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U. S. 489 (1996).
(50) 473 U. S. 134 (1985).
(51) Id. at 136.
(52) Id.
(53) Ms. Russell had also asserted state-law claims, but they were held
preempted. Russell, 473 U. S. at 137.
(54) Id. at 140 (emphasis deleted) (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 1109(a) (2006)).
(55) Langbein, Trail of Error, supra note 154.
(56) Russell, 473 U. S. at 144.
(57) Id. at 139 n. 5.
(58) Although dicta, the lower courts interpreted the broad language in Russell
to mean that consequential damages are not available in actions brought to
recover benefits due under the plan.
(59) 508 U. S. 248 (1993).
(60) Id.
(61) Id.
(62) See supra Part III. B-C. Russell was a disability (not health) insurance
case. But it strains credulity to believe that the Court, in deciding Russell,
was not imagining a world filled with plaintiffs seeking consequential
damages in health care disputes.
(63) That Hewitt was not a fiduciary, Mertens, 508 U. S. at 253, is immaterial.
At issue was the relief available regarding a claim asserted to be actionable
because it fell short of a fiduciary-like standard of care.





































(65) Coincidentally, its drafting and passage overlapped with a different type of
conglomerate. See, e. g., Harvey H. Segal, The Urge to Merge : The Time of
the Conglomerates, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1968, at SM32.
(66) Jess Bravin& Evan Perez, Justice Souter to Retire From Court,WALL ST.
J., May 1, 2009, at A1.
(67) Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U. S. 359, 361 (1980).
(68) 第 189 回国会 参議院 厚生労働委員会 第 9号 (平成二十七年四月二十
三日) 独立行政法人に係る改革を推進するための厚生労働省関係法律の整備
等に関する法律案 (内閣提出、衆議院送付)
http : //kokkai. ndl. go. jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/189/0062/18904230062009c.
html (2015 年 9月 1日確認)
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(引用はじめ)。○川田龍平君 ありがとうございます。川田龍平です。
独法改革推進法案に関して、年金積立金管理運用独立行政法人、いわゆる
GPIFについて質問いたします。
(中略)
現在、株式相場は好調ですが、長期的な観点から、このような株式比率が
高い基本ポートフォリオによる運用が果たして安全と言えるのでしょうか。
国民の大切な年金積立金を過度なリスクにさらしていないか、運用における
リスクの考え方を含めて大臣の見解を伺います。
○国務大臣 (塩崎恭久君) 先ほど来、議論が少しございましたけれども、
年金積立金の運用というのは、将来の安定的な年金給付を確保するというの
が一番大事なことでございまして、一方で、デフレからの脱却ということを
言っておりますけれども、デフレ脱却後の緩やかなインフレの下での経済・
運用環境、これに対応しないといけない。さらには、年金財政上必要な利回
りを最低限のリスクで確保するということが必要だということでございまし
て、この場合のリスクというのは、いろいろ議論があるわけでありますが、
実はこれ、リスクにはいろいろなものがあって、多面的かつ長期的な観点で
考える必要がございます。
将来の年金給付をしっかり確保するためには、年金財政上必要とされる積
立金額を下回るリスクをできる限り抑制するということが重要でございまし
て、今回の変更後の基本ポートフォリオというのは、デフレ脱却、適度なイ
ンフレ環境への移行など、長期的な経済・運用環境の変化に即して株式など
の分散投資を進めたものでございます。
その結果、単年度の収益率の振れ幅は大きくなって、この振れ幅のことを
リスクと言う場合ももちろんありますけれども、我々、年金を預かる者とし
ては、年金財政上必要な積立金を下回るリスクというのは、この振れ幅は大
きくなった一方で、少なくなったというふうに理解をしているところでござ
います。(引用おわり)
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